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Abstract
With the advance of social network sites, employers can screen applicantsonline proles to
gain additional personal information without the applicantsawareness. We investigate whether
employers rely on such online information when deciding to call an applicant back for interview.
During a 12-month period, we set-up a eld experiment and sent more than 800 applications of
two ctitious applicants that di¤er for a signal - their perceived origins - solely available on their
Facebook proles. A 40 % gap between the two applicants highlights that online proles are used
to screen and select applicants. For many recruiters, Facebook proles have become a part of the
application material. An unexpected change in the Facebook layout altered the display of our
online signal. This natural experiment allows us to pinpoint the cause of screening, and therefore
the odds of being called back for interview, within the online prole.
Keywords: Online Social Network; Labor Market; Privacy; Field experiment.
JEL Codes: D83; C93; M51.
1
1 Introduction
The crucial role of information in improving the quality of the employer-applicant match is well known
(Stigler, 1962; Spence, 1963). Recruiters want to acquire as much information as possible, using two
main sources of information: application material (resume, cover letter, etc.) and referrals or word-of-
mouth (Rees, 1966; Granovetter, 1995). With the advance of the Internet, new sources of information
on applicants such as Social Networks Sites (SNSs) are now easily accessible. For instance, media
regularly report employees dismissals motivated by personal information disclosed on social network
proles1 and declarative surveys document the use of SNSs by employers during hiring (Clark and
Roberts, 2010). As SNSs become ubiquitous, adverse screening based on information disclosed online
may increasingly impact employers-employees relationships, especially since such practices can be
conducted without the applicantsawareness. In this paper, we propose an experimental setting to
assess whether SNSs constitute a new reliable source of information on applicants for French recruiters.
In other words, do French recruiters screen applicantsFacebook proles and use this information to
grant or deny an interview?
Our paper deals with the hiring process from the employersperspective by testing whether em-
ployers consider SNSs as a reliable information channel about applicants. The hiring process is a
central labor market mechanism and is crucial for the e¢ ciency of the economy. The better the match
between an employer and an applicant, the higher will be the employees productivity (Autor, 2001).
However, the economic literature shows that hiring is plagued by search costs and incomplete bilateral
information between employers and applicants (Stigler, 1962; Spence, 1973). As a consequence, both
players implement search and signaling strategies to nd the best match (Rees, 1966; Salop, 1973a,
1973b; Spence, 1973; Holzer, 1987). Although there is a large literature on applicantssearch and sig-
naling strategies (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999a), studies on the similar strategies from employers
are scarcer (Granovetter, 1995; DeVaro, 2008; Oyer and Schae¤er, 2011). Employers play a central
role in the functioning of the labor market and the job matching process since applicants accept almost
all job o¤ers (Barron et al., 1997). The literature on employers deals mainly with two types of em-
ployer search strategies: extensive vs. intensive, and sequential vs. non-sequential screening (Holzer,
1987; Barron et al., 1997). These search strategies could be implemented using formal or informal
1Some examples of employees dismissals related to SNSs and reported in the New York Times:
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/22/technology/employers-social-media-policies-come-under-regulatory-
scrutiny.html?pagewanted=all, or BBC: http://www.bbc.com/capital/story/20130626-can-social-media-get-you-red
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search methods (Rees, 1966; Albrecht and van Ours, 2006; van Ommeren and Russo, 2014). These
two methods are associated with two main sources of information for recruiters: the formal applica-
tion material (resume, cover letter, etc.) and the informal channels (referrals, word-of-mouth, etc.).
In addition to these traditional sources of information, a recent trend in work on employerssearch
strategies investigates the use of online SNSs in hiring (Clark and Roberts, 2010; Acquisti and Fong,
2013). Our paper aims to extend these works on employerssearch strategies. More particularly, we
deal with the employers using a new channel, the online SNSs, to obtain information about applicants
during hiring.
So far, evidence on the use of SNSs by employers relies on declarative surveys whose results show
strong variation (see Clark and Roberts (2010) for examples). These variations could stem in part
from the qualitative nature of these surveys (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001) and in part from the
fact that using personal information during hiring is illegal, meaning respondents might be reluctant
to truthfully answer questions about their hiring practices. To avoid declarative bias, we opt for a eld
experiment methodologyand create two ctitious applicants with identical resumes and application
cover letters but one di¤erence in their Facebook proles. While the control applicant has a typically
French prole, the test applicants Facebook prole reveals Marrakesh to be his hometown and Arabic
a spoken language. This signal appears only on the Facebook prole. We chose this signal because the
literature on labor market discrimination shows that this characteristic negatively a¤ects an applicants
call-back rate (Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) for the U.S.; Duguet et al. 2005, 2010; Jacquemet
et al., 2012 for France). Each applicant has a unique rst-name and last-name combination to ensure
that an employer searching the applicant on the Internet nds the right prole. The applicantsrst
names were chosen from among the most frequent French-sounding names for males of the applicants
age. Our candidates then apply for job openings for an accountant in the greater Paris area. In
the usual testing methodology, two applications for a job opening are sent simultaneously and the
resumes and cover letters of the two ctitious applicants are su¢ ciently di¤erent to avoid detection
by the employer (this approach is called systematic attribution). In our case, the two applicants have
identical resumes and cover letters and di¤er only in their name for identication, and their Facebook
prole for treatment manipulation. Therefore, we send one application per job opening using the
pseudo-random attribution method (see Ahmed et al., 2013; Acquisti and Fong, 2013). With this
method, we control during the experiment that the two ctitious candidates are applying for similar
job positions. Following the literature on hiring, we consider a call-back from the recruiter to set up
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a job interview as a positive outcome. Since the two applicants are similar except for the Facebook
prole displaying their hometown and languages spoken, a signicant di¤erence in call-back rate can
stem only from observation by the employer of the signal that is available exclusively on the applicants
Facebook proles.2
From March 2012 to March 2013, we sent more than 800 applications, evenly divided between the
two applicants. The response rates for our ctitious applicants are signicantly di¤erent, at respec-
tively 16.9% for the control candidate and 12.2% for the test applicant. More precisely, the experiment
could be split into two sub periods - before and after an unexpected change of Facebook layout in
December 2012 that modied the signal. During the rst sub-period (March 2012 to December 2012),
the call-back rates show a clear and consistent gap of 8 percentage points between the control (21.3%)
and test (13.4%) applicants. This di¤erence shows that employers search for additional information
on the applicant beyond the application package, and use the information found on the Facebook
prole to select an applicant for a job interview. Private information on Facebook can indeed a¤ect
dramatically the odds to be called back for an interview. In our case, a small signal on the Facebook
page reduced the probability to be called back by 40 %. In other words, Facebook proles have be-
come a part of the application material for many recruiters, and then, a¤ect clearly the labor market
functioning. In addition to this rst result, we observed an exogenous change in the layout of the
Facebook prole. In December 2012, information on the languages spoken by the applicant, instead
of being displayed in the front page of the prole was pushed back into a tab. Shortly after this layout
change, which reduced the di¤erentiating signal, the gap between the callback rates of two candidates
reduced dramatically, suggesting the existence of search cost associated with the screening of an en-
tire Facebook prole. This search cost seems to limit the depth of employers search for personal
information.
This article is organized as follows. The rst section reviews the job search literature with a special
focus on employers strategies, and presents our main hypothesis. The second section presents the
eld experiment and our protocol and the third presents the results of the eld experiment. The nal
section o¤ers some conclusions.
2The main di¢ culty involved in testing our hypothesis is that the recruiters online search is not an observable
variable, i.e. it is impossible to know who are the viewers of a given online prole. For this reason, we set up an
experiment so that viewing one or the other of our ctitious proles translates into di¤erent call back rates, which
are directly observable. Incidentally, this also explains why legal attempts to forbid online searches during hiring are
di¢ cult to implement: recruitersbehaviors are not directly observable.
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2 Literature review
The hiring process is usually characterized with search costs and bilateral information asymmetries
(Stigler, 1962; Spence, 1973; Salop and Salop, 1976). In this context, applicants and recruiters aim at
reducing these costs and asymmetries by implementing signalling and/or search strategies, reinforcing
the importance of information. These strategies have been extensively studied in the case of job
seekers.3 In contrast, employers strategies have been far less explored despite their importance in
the hiring process. In this article, we focus on employerssearch strategies, and especially on their
evolutions with the Internet.4
The literature on recruiters highlights the use of two main search strategies: extensive/intensive
and sequential/nonsequential, depending on the number of screened applicants and whether the
selection process is carried out continuously or sequentially (Rees, 1966; Barron et al., 1985). These
strategies could be implemented through formal or informal search methods (Rees, 1966, Albrecht and
van Ours, 2006; van Ommeren and Russo, 2014). Formal method refers to the use of advertisements
in newspaper or employment agency, whereas informal method draws on recruiters social network.
These search methods imply that recruiters use two di¤erent support/channel of information about
applicants with application materials in the case of formal method (Rees, 1966), and referrals and
word-of-mouth for informal methods (Granovetter, 1995). More recently, the spread of the Internet
and development of online social networks has had a strong impact on employers strategies and
potentially provides a new channel of transmission of information via online proles on SNSs.
Employerssearch strategies
The literature on the employerssearch strategies during hiring is more recent and rather scarce
(Granovetter, 1995; DeVaro, 2008; Oyer and Schae¤er, 2011).5 According to this literature, employers
can choose between extensive search, i.e. search on a pool of applicants as large as possible, and/or
intensive search, i.e. search for additional information on selected applicants (Rees, 1966; Barron et
al., 1985; Holzer, 1987). Barron et al. (1985) use data such as average number of hours per applicant
for recruiting, to provide evidence of the existence of such strategies. More recent work highlights
3The literature on applicantsjob search and signaling is large and beyond the scope of this article (see Lazear and
Oyer (2007) for a good review). For theoretical approaches, see Stigler (1962), Salop (1973a, 1973b) and Spence (1973).
For empirical evidence, see Stigler (1962), Rees (1966) and Holzer (1987).
4For the literature on employerssignaling strategies see Salop and Salop (1976), and Guasch and Weiss (1980) for
theoretical models. For empirical work, one can refer to Holzer (1987) and Albrecht and van Ours (2006).
5See Mortensen and Pissarides (1999a, 1999b) and Rogerson et al. (2005) for surveys dealing with search models for
applicants in the labor market.
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an important feature of these search strategies, i.e. whether or not search is sequential. The model
proposed by Burdett and Cunningham (1998) considers search to be sequential if the rm o¤ers a
job position to an applicant immediately after receipt of her application and assuming the applicants
productivity exceeds a certain threshold. If the applicant accepts the position the search process
stops. Conversely, non-sequential search assumes that the rm pools a certain number of applications
and then screens them, and nally o¤ers the position to the best applicant. Empirical studies using
vacancy characteristics (required education, work experience, etc.), investigate the determinants of
search strategies. They show that both extensive and intensive strategies can be optimal depending
on characteristics such as job seekers strategies, vacancy duration, job characteristics, etc. (van
Ommeren and Russo, 2014). However, in most of these studies, the nature of the dependent variable,
namely vacancy duration, makes interpretation of the results di¢ cult. Andrews et al. (2008) point
out that a short (long) vacancy duration cannot be exactly interpreted as a sequential (non-sequential)
search strategy. According to van Ommeren and Russo (2014), empirical studies highlight a strong
relationship between search strategies (sequential or non sequential) and search methods (advertising,
private or public agency, etc.).
Employerssearch methods and channels of transmission of information
These search strategies could be implemented using formal or informal search methods (Rees, 1966;
Albrecht and van Ours, 2006; van Ommeren and Russo, 2014). Formal search methods refer to the use
by recruiters of advertisements and employment agency to ll a position. Informal search methods
rely on information gathered or received by recruiters from their social network (friends, relatives,
current or incumbent personnel, etc.). In the case of formal methods, the information consists in
the application material (resume, cover letter, etc.) directly or indirectly (via e.g. employment
agency) provided by the applicant (Rees, 1966). In the informal method, recruiters gather or receive
information through referrals and word-of-mouth from friends, relatives or former/current employees
(Albrecht and van Ours, 2006). In other words, each type of method is associated with a particular
channel of information.
Formal information channels include the basic application material screened by employers to select
applicants, i.e. cover letters and resumes. The information provided consists mainly of objectively
veriable information such as education, work experience, qualications, etc. Employers can screen
these documents and contact previous employers and/or school heads. During interview, if required
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for the position advertised, the employer may have the opportunity to carry out additional checks
such as medical examination, credit worthiness, police record, etc. (Rees, 1966; Spence, 1973; Holzer,
1987; DeVaro, 2008).
Informal information channels include information acquired from former colleagues and/or friends
of the applicant through referrals and word-of-mouth (Rees, 1966; Granovetter, 1995; Montgomery,
1992, Albrecht and van Ours, 2006; van Ommeren and Russo, 2008). According to Rees (1966),
former or current good employees are considered by employers as reliable source of information about
potential recruits for two main reasons. First, employers anticipate that employees tend to recommend
candidates with similar competences and location. Second, employees know that their referrals can
impact their own reputation. As a result, they tend to recommend people who they think will be most
appropriate (Sterling, 2014). Furthermore, applicants who have been recommended for a position by
a friend or a relative tend to be more condent in the information provided about the position (type
of work, working atmosphere, bosss behaviors, etc.). Consequently, such applicants are more able to
assess whether their competences are a good t with the position. The empirical literature underlines
the complex e¤ects of informal contacts and networks on labor outcomes due to individual, relational
and employer heterogeneity (see Ionnides and Loury (2004) for a review). Since the work of Rees (1966)
and Granovetter (1995), many studies highlight the importance of referrals and recommendations in
hiring (Obukhova, 2013). More recent studies using newly available data (Bayer et al., 2008; DeVaro,
2008) show that informal channels of information matter as they carry reliable information that could
only with di¢ culty spread through formal channels.
SNSs as a new source of information for recruiters?
The labor market is being heavily impacted by the advance of the Internet. Employers benet
from lower costs for advertising job openings and applicants face lower costs in searching for relevant
job openings and sending applications. Overall, lower costs are expected to increase the e¢ ciency of
the labor market by improving the quality of employee-employer matching (Autor, 2001; Manning,
2011).6 However, scholars point out that the ease of application for job seekers can result in excessive
irrelevant applications which may increase employerscost of selection (Autor, 2001; Seabright and
Sen, 2014). As a consequence of the overload of formal and standardized application information,
employers may turn to informal information on applicants to narrow their search.
6See Pissarides (2000), and, Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) for a canonical model that introduces the matching
function but does not deal explicitly with the e¤ect of the Internet on the labor market.
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In addition to easier access to formal information on applicants, the Internet also provides new
sources of information on applicants: their SNSs proles. The wide use of SNSs is making it easy for
employers to check background information about applicant (schools, current and former positions,
etc.), but also to access personal information not dedicated to them (trips, friends, hobbies, opinions,
etc.). In this way, SNSs could constitute a new informal source of information in addition to referrals
and word-of-mouth. Unlike these sources of information, interaction with others is not required in
the case of SNSs. Recruiters can check online proles without the applicants awareness or consent.
Evidence of such practices among recruiters has been recently underlined in the literature through
declarative surveys (Clark and Roberts, 2010) or eld experiment on online discrimination (Acquisti
and Fong, 2013).
This privacy concern raises ethical and economic issues. Most notably, there is an important
discrepancy between the intent of SNSs users and that of employers. The former tend to use SNSs
casually as a tool for social interaction, including recreational purposes, while the latter use them
to gather personal information on applicants with direct professional consequences. This di¤erence
in the use of personal information may harm the quality of the relationship between employers and
employees (Clark and Roberts, 2010). Incidentally, this new hiring practice is an illustration of
the shifting boundaries between the personal and professional spheres. On an economic viewpoint,
personal information disclosed online may constitute a relevant determinant of hiring decision. Apart
from Acquisti and Fong (2013) for the U.S. labor market, how secondary usage of personal information
impacts matching during hiring has been neglected in the literature. Following this recent strand, our
paper tests whether SNSs has become a new reliable informal source of information for recruiters on
applicants (see Figure 1).
3 Experimental setting: Methodology and signal
Methodology
The most direct way to establish the use of social media in hiring is asking employers. However,
there is a strong declarative bias due to the legal/ethical nature of the question. To circumvent this,
we set up a eld experiment.
Field experiments have been used in the literature to capture employershiring practices. They
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Figure 1: Sources of information about applicants
rely upon two main methodologies: situation (or audit) testing,7 and correspondence testing. The
audit approach allows to focus on employershiring behaviors along the multiple steps of the hiring
process, i.e. i) whether they recall the candidate for an interview, ii) whether they o¤er the position
after the interview, and iii) the wage level o¤ered. The rst audit testing was conducted by Daniel
(1968).8 One of the limitations of this approach is that it is di¢ cult in practice to ensure similarity
of applicantsperformance during a face-to-face interview. Moreover, the actors direct interaction
with the employer during the interview raises strong concerns of experimenter bias (see Bertrand and
Mullainathan 2004 for further discussion).
Correspondence testing involves fewer methodological issues (Riach and Rich, 2002). It allows
for a higher level of control over the experimental environment, especially the content of applica-
tions. It is also less time-consuming (Bursell, 2007), and easier to rigorously reproduce. According to
Bursell (2007), correspondence testing is a type of randomized experiment,9 and therefore provides
the strongest possible opportunity to draw causal inferences. The main di¢ culty lies in making the
applications similar in all relevant aspects, so that only the tested characteristic varies between the
two applications. Last, although correspondence testing reveals discrimination at the call-back stage
and not at the nal hiring decision stage, it has been shown that around 90% of the discrimination
occurs at the call-back stage (Riach and Rich, 2002).
7Audit testing consists in real persons briefed by the experimenters, usually professional actors, applying for the
opening and presenting themselves to the job interview. They then act in a similar manner for every interview. The
characteristics of the actors or the way they behave during the interview can thus be manipulated all other things equal.
8See Bursell (2007) for other labor market-related audits results and limitations.
9Examples of correspondence tests: in the UK (Brown and Gay, 1985; Hubbuck and Carter, 1980), in Australia
(Riach and Rich, 1991), in the U.S. (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004) and in France (Duguet and Petit, 2005 ; Duguet
et al., 2010; Jacquemet et al., 2013).
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Therefore, we choose to carry out a correspondence test. However, unlike usual correspondence
tests where recruiters receive at least two ctitious applications, we send one application per job
opening with quasi-identical applicants. We created two ctitious applicants with identical application
material (resumes and cover letters) except for one manipulated characteristic or signal. This approach
has two main advantages. First, the two applicants are identical in terms of competence and experience
which drastically limits potential compounds. Second, as a consequence, each recruiter receives only
one application. This means that the study only marginally inuences the hiring process (compared
to sending multiple applications per opening) which is desirable from an ethical view point and in
term of e¢ ciency. Third, as the applications are sent to two separate samples of rms, the detection
risk is non-existent. We therefore need to insure that the two applicants apply for similar positions
in terms of job and rm characteristics. We do this by using job openings from the French public
employment agency that provide detailed information on both the position and the rm. This point
is developed in the following protocol description.
Signal
In our experiment, the di¤erence between the two applicants consists in an Arabic signal on one
applicants Facebook prole. The Arabic prole mentions that the applicant is from a Moroccan city
(Marrakesh), and speaks Arabic. The control prole is from a French city (Brive-la-Gaillarde) and
speaks Italian. We thus di¤erentiate our applicants by city of origin and language spoken as displayed
on the Facebook prole.
The literature highlights the importance of an applicants foreign origins (see e.g. Duguet et al.,
2010 for applicants from the Paris area) and language skills for potential employers during hiring
(Oreopoulos, 2009; Edo et al., 2013). Therefore, provided the signal is perceived, it can be expected
to have a negative impact on the odds of being called back.
The literature shows that, within the application package, information triggering employer rejection
can be conveyed by the applicants name, especially her foreign origin (Bertrand and Mullainathan,
2004; Ahmed et al., 2008; Jacquemet and Yannelis, 2012; Berson, 2012; Duguet et al., 2010), or part-
ners gender (Ahmed et al., 2013) which signals the candidates sexual orientation, doing voluntary
work for a community organization (Weichselbaumer, 2003; Drydakis, 2009), or the photograph at-
tached to the resume (Weichselbaumer, 2003). However, manipulating those signals is not a suitable
strategy in our case since information on names and hobbies is included in the resume and could not
be evidence that the employer consulted the online prole.
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Ahmed and Hammarstedt (2008) use the Internet as a medium to test for discriminatory practices
related to rental housing ads posted online. However, as in every preceding study, the discriminating
information is contained in the application package. In our study, the application is completely
similar for the two ctitious candidates, and the Internet is the medium for both transmission of the
application (by the candidate) and discovery of discriminating information (by the recruiter).
Resumes, cover letters and Facebook proles
For each applicant, on both the resume and the cover letter we indicate the following information,
in order: name, address, holding of a driving license, date of birth and age, phone number and e-
mail address. The applicants address is in an a­ uent Paris district (15th arrondissement) to avoid
location-based discrimination. The applicant holds a driving license. The phone numbers are distinct
in each resume so as to track candidatescall back. The e-mail address of each applicant is registered
on Gmail with user name following the same pattern "rstname.lastname@gmail.com". Names and
dates of birth are also available on the Facebook proles.
In our base resume, the applicant has a three-year higher education degree in accounting, a awless
school record, and three internships with various experience suitable for most accounting jobs. A
cover letter is included in the application. A cover letter that is too general and standardized is
usually not su¢ cient; employers usually seek a specic professional prole (customers, suppliers, asset
management, etc.). We pre-dened parts of the letter with standard sentences corresponding to the
common proles sought by recruiters, and included them according to what was specied in the ad
(see Annex 16 and 17). We used information on the recruiting rm that was available on the Internet,
such as o¢ cial websites, web articles, etc. If we were unable to nd information about the rm,
we sent an unspecic cover letters. Resumes and cover letters were submitted as pdf les. Pdf is a
standard format that is easily readable by recruiters. Before the start of the experiment and alongside
conducting pre-tests, we interviewed human resources managers to ensure relevance of the cover letters
to current job market conditions.
The rst and last names of each applicant are French-sounding. The rst names were picked from
the top-ve rst names for the year of birth. Each combination of rst name and last name is unique,
and our ctitious proles are the sole results when searching on these rst and last names on the three
leading French language web search engines, and on Facebook.10 Each combination corresponds to
10The market shares of the web search engines in France in December 2012 were: 90.1% for Google, 3.3% for Bing
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one unique Facebook prole. To test that the results do not depend on the specic names or work
experience of the rst pair, we create a second pair of applicants with di¤erent names and with fewer
work experience.
Work experience
Time Span First name & Name Candidates type at the beginning
of the experiment
March 2012 Thomas Marvaux Control (French signal) 6.5 to 13 months
- Sept. 2012 Stéphane Marcueil Test (Morrocan signal)
Oct. 2012 Julien Bautrant Control (French signal) 1 to 6.5 months
- March 2013 Nicolas Lautrant Test (Morrocan signal)
Table 1: The two pairs of applicants
Selecting the job openings
We selected the job openings published by the French public agency for employment, Pôle Emploi
(PE), during the period March, 2012 to March, 2013. Only job openings posted through the PE public
agency website are collected; other recruitment channels, such as Monster, are not considered. We
focus on PE openings for two main reasons: First, PE systematically provides detailed information
on the job (wage, contract, working hours, required education and work experience, etc.) and the
rm (name, location, sector, size, etc.) which is crucial for pseudo-random attribution of applicants
to job o¤ers. Other popular French employment websites (Monster, Keljob, Indeed, etc.) provide
much less detail except in the case of a few job ads. Second, since PE is the public employment
agency it has a transparent equal opportunities policy and discriminatory employers will likely avoid
posting their openings on the PE website. Auto-selection of employers using this recruitment channel
is thus likely to make it more di¢ cult to nd a signicant di¤erence between the two candidates.
The applications are submitted via a standard email referring to the advertised position and the
reference number, with the resume and cover letter as attachments.11 We selected only openings that
provided the recruiters direct contact information (contact name and e-mail), and excluded those
which required the applicant to contact a third-party, usually PE or a recruitment agency. Only
openings for relatively long-term contracts were considered, i.e. jobs with an undened-duration work
contract (CDI) or a xed-duration contract (CDD) of 6 months or more.12 Our applicants have
and 1.5% for Yahoo (source: http://www.atinternet.com, last retrieved: June, 2014).
11A few ads were disregarded either because the e-mail address provided in the ad was wrong or no email address
was included.
12We assume that very short employment periods are not associated with deep search or screening of applicants.
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three years of undergraduate education in accounting, and we responded to ads in the three relevant
categories (accountant, assistant-accountant, and aid-accountant) in the PE categorization. For each
selected opening, we generate the application material, i.e. the resume and the cover letter, using
pre-dened key sentences to match advertised job. At this point, to avoid experimenter bias, the
material was not assigned to an applicant. Assignment to an applicant occurred only after all the
application material had been generated.
Pseudo-Random Assignment Procedure
We observe the recruitersbehavior through the di¤erences (if any) in return rates for the two
ctitious applicants. The candidates have identical application packages and di¤er only in selected
information on their Facebook proles. Following Ahmed et al. (2013) and Acquisti and Fong (2013),
we use a pseudo-random assignment procedure where only one application is sent per job o¤er. The
type of applicant is pseudo-randomly assigned to each application, so that all along the experiment
similar job o¤ers are attributed to each applicant.13 Half of our sample of job openings receives an
application from the control candidate and the other half from the Arabic candidates. The tradi-
tional systematic assignment procedure provides information on how a given employer responds to
every candidate who applied. However, we are interested in showing that employers that received
an application from the control candidate called him back for interview more often, on average, than
employers who received the Arabic candidate. We control that this systematic di¤erence is not due
to rm or job characteristics. In addition, when using a testing approach the experimenter needs to
construct two ctitious candidates who are su¢ ciently di¤erent to avoid detection but close enough
that the di¤erence in call backs between the two candidates can be attributable only to the factor of
interest, and not to other factors which were changed to di¤erentiate the two candidates. The random
assignment procedure requires that the number of applications is doubled but completely alleviates
the trade-o¤ between the risk of candidates being detected and the ability to interpret the results. As
our candidates never both apply to the same company, the risk of detection is considerably lower than
with a usual testing methodology. And since we do not need to di¤erentiate the candidates articially
to avoid detection, we can o¤er strictly identical candidates.
13This pseudo-random assignment is based on job position (accountant, assistant-accountant, etc.), required work
experience, and rm size and sector (see Table 2 for descriptive statistics).
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4 Results
Experiment overview
The experiment covers a period of one year from March 19, 2012 to March 19, 2013. During
this period, we sent a total of 837 applications. As shown in Figure 2, we sent applications for both
candidates at similar rates over the period. The vertical red line indicates the time when we changed
to the second pair of ctitious applicants (names, work experience and Facebook proles), as discussed
in the previous section.
Figure 2: Cumulative number of applications sent, by type of applicant
Samples balancing Since we send one application per opening, our database is divided into
two samples, rms that received the control candidate and rms that received the test candidate.
We ensured that the two samples were balanced in relation to rmsand job positionsobservable
characteristics by using pseudo-random assignment. Table 2 below presents the descriptive statistics
for the job positions and rms applied to.14
We observe that, on average, both applicants applied to similar positions in terms of jobs and rm
characteristics. During the whole experiment our applicants received 122 positive recalls for interview.
14Tests of equality of mean or proportion (depending on the type of variable) have been computed. These tests allow
us to accept the null hypothesis of equality in proportion or mean at the 5% threshold for all variables in Table 2.
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Variable Description
Control
candidate
Test
candidate
Accountant: 41.2% 39.1%
Specialized acc.: 13.6% 15.8%
Job position Accounting assistant: 26.2% 25.2%
Acc. & secretary assistant: 15.9% 17.3%
Other accounting assistant: 3.1% 2.6%
Contract Long term (CDI) 74.8% 74.8%
Short term (CDD) 25.2% 25.2%
Short term contract length (mean/sd/min/max, month): 7.8/3.6/6/24 8.1/4.1/6/36
Work time (mean/sd/min/max, hours): 34.0/5.9/7.5/40 34.0/5.7/8/43
Not specied: 37.6% 40.1%
CAP/BEP: 2.1% 2.1%
Required education Bac: 10.2% 7.2%
Bac +2: 45.0% 45.8%
Bac +3: 5.0% 4.8%
No experience: 23.3% 23.3%
6 months - 1 year: 11.7% 12.7%
Required work experience 2 years: 28.6% 25.4%
3 years: 17.4% 19.2%
4 or 5 years: 19.1% 19.4%
Wage (mean/sd/min/max, e/hour): 12.5/2.6/8.6/23.6 12.4/2.3/8.5/20.8
Application delay 1.94 (sd: 1.52) 1.98 (sd: 1.58)
0-5 employees: 23.6% 23.5%
6-19 emp.: 27.6% 27.4%
Size 20-49 emp.: 19.7% 19.9%
50-249 emp.: 19.3% 20.1%
250+ emp.: 9.8% 9.1%
Private: 82.6% 82.0%
Firm status Public: 6.0% 5.0%
Not-for-prot: 11.4% 13.0%
Sector See Annex 1 - - - -
Location See Annex 1 - - - -
Total number of applications 420 417
Table 2: Overall descriptive statistics of the applications
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This global return rate is quite high (14.6%) compared to other similar studies (see e.g. Duguet and
Petit, 2005 and Duguet et al., 2010 for the Paris region). The most plausible explanation for the higher
call back rate in our study is that we matched cover letter and resume to the job opening for each
application, incorporating pre-dened sentences corresponding to the characteristics of the rm and
the advertised position. Most recruiters contacted our applicants by phone (68.0%) or e-mail (26.3%).
A few chose contact by both phone and e-mail (5.7%). All the applicantspostal addresses were real,
but no regular mail was ever received. Table 3 shows the overall results of the eld experiment.
Application outcome Total
Type of applicant Negative Positive
Control candidate 349 (83.1%) 71 (16.9%) 420
Test candidate 366 (87.8%) 51 (12.2%) 417
Total 715 (85.4%) 122 (14.6%) 837
Table 3: Overall experiment outcomes
Table 3 and Figure 3 show a signicantly lower call-back rate for the test candidate (12.2%)
compared to the control (16.9%).15 A Chi2 test indicates that this di¤erence is signicant (Chi2
statistics=3.67; Pr=0.055). This result validates our hypothesis that recruiters screen the Facebook
proles of our applicants and used the information available on these proles when deciding whether
to call our applicants back for interview. Robustness checks of this result are provided in Annex 2
which also includes time dummies and control variables in Table 2.
Variable of interest The three robustness checks in Annex 2 conrm the signicant negative
impact of the Arabic signal available on the online prole, on the probability of being invited for
interview.16 Models 2 and 3 which include additional control variables show that some of them also
have a signicant inuence on the likelihood of a positive outcome.
Control variables The control variables which turn out to be signicant highlight additional
results about the hiring process generally. Firstly, we observe a negative impact of over-education on
15Figure 3 is presented in chronological order. The work experience of the rst two applicants ranged from 6.5 months
in March 2012 to 13 months in September 2012, while the work experience of the last two applicants ranged from 1
month in October 2012 to 6.5 months in March 2013. See Annex 13 for the experiments timing.
16Three models are provided in Annex 2: Model 1 contains only the main explicative variable tested in this work,
namely test, Model 2 includes all the available control variables, and Model 3 includes all the control variables except
mean wage due to multicollinearity issues. The condition index of Model 2 is equal to 29.8. It is very close to the
threshold indicating multicollinearity problems according to Belsley et al. (1980). This multicollinearity problem is
not surprising as the wage o¤ered is related to the required education level and to other job characteristics such as the
required experience, the sector, the job position and the rm size among others. Once we exclude mean wage in the
model 3, the condition index fall down to 20.4.
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the probability of being selected. Secondly, during the experiment the applicantswork experience
ranged from 1 to 13 months. It appears that only a large di¤erence between applicants current work
experience and that required by recruiters is an impediment. Only four or ve years of experience
di¤erent from what the recruiter requires seems to negatively a¤ect the odds of call-back. Thirdly,
we noticed a negative non-linear e¤ect of distance from the job. Close commuting distances (30-90
minutes) have a negative inuence on the probability to be selected, but longer distances (over 90
minutes) and shorter (under 30 minutes) have no signicant impact, suggesting that employers would
expect the successful applicant to relocate closer rather than endure a long commute (van Ommeren
et al., 1999). Finally, only three sectors have signicant e¤ects, namely industry, teaching/research,
and hotel/restaurant. One possible explanation for this is that although we designed the applicants
resumes to t as many industries as possible, they do not t all activities. The activities of teaching and
research use very specic public accounting beyond the scope of our applicantsskills and education.
Exogenous layout change On December, 2012 Facebook changed the layout of its proles,17
from a single page to a front page which includes tabs to provide access to certain personal information.
Such personal information, which used to be directly available in the rst page of the prole, is now
available only if viewers click on the relevant tab. Specically, the new proles provide information
on city of origin on the front page but information on language(s) is accessed by clicking the About
tab. Other aspects of the experimental setting remained unchanged. Comparing the results before
and after the layout modication allows us to isolate the impact, if any, of this ergonomic change on
the economic outcome. The period from March, 2012 to December, 2012 allows us to establish our
main result: a Facebook prole is, for the recruiters, a reliable source of information on applicants.18
The second period from December, 2012 to March, 2013 provides some evidence about the depth
of the screening performed by recruiters within the online proles. We discuss the results of these
consecutive parts of the experiment below.
17Link to the o¢ cial announcement of the Facebook layout change: http://newsroom.fb.com/News/584/
Improvements-to-Timeline].
Link to Facebooks announcement of the layout change in December on ABC News: http://abcnews.go.
com/blogs/technology/2012/12/facebook-may-be-changing-your-timeline-redesign-tests-in-progress/#.
UNOU516etEM.twitter and on other news, or bloggers websites that observed this change about Decem-
ber 2012: http://mashable.com/2013/01/08/facebook-timeline-change-new/ ; http://socialmediatoday.
com/mohammed-anzil/1100946/facebook-way-change-your-timeline-again ; http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_
3-57543175-93/facebook-looking-into-a-slimmer-trimmer-timeline-layout/ ; http://www.insidefacebook.com/
2012/10/31/facebook-tests-timeline-layout-with-single-column-of-posts/ and http://www.marismith.com/
quick-guide-facebook-profile-layout-image/.
18 In the rst 8 months, the control applicant received 62 positive call-backs from 311 applicants (19.9%); the test
applicant was recalled 36 times from 302 applications (11.9%), i.e. Chi2 = 7.33; Pr = 0.007.
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Figure 3: Cumulative call-back rates by applicant type
First part of the experiment
The rst two applicants were used during the 6.5 months from March 19, 2012 to September 30,
2012. The two applicants have work experience ranging from 6.5 months at the beginning of this part
to 13 months at the end (see Annex 13 for more details on the experiment timing). During this period
we sent a total of 462 applications. Table 4 and Figure 4 below summarize the results during this rst
period.
Application outcome Total
Type of applicant Negative Positive
Control candidate 181 (78.7%) 49 (21.3%) 230
Test candidate 201 (86.6%) 31 (13.4%) 232
Total 382 (82.7%) 80 (17.3%) 462
Table 4: Call-back statistics of the rst two applicants
The rst part of the experiment shows a consistent gap in the number of call-backs received by
our two applicants. In particular, Figure 4 shows a roughly constant gap of 8 percentage points
between the two applicants in favor of the control candidate who received 21.3% of positive returns
compared to 13.4% for the test candidate. A Chi2 test conrms the signicance of this di¤erence
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Figure 4: First two applicants call-back rates
(Chi2 statistics=5.09; Pr=0.024).19
Based on the experimental protocol in place, this gap favoring the control candidate can result only
from two joint choices of employers: i) screening of applicantsFacebook proles, and ii) exploitation
of the information collected from these proles to decide whether or not to recall the candidate.
Incidentally, the fact that employers use the information obtained from Facebook suggests also that it
is considered reliable although not part of the formal application package. It appears that the content
of the online prole seems to carry important weight for the decision to call back.
Second part of the experiment
The second pair of ctitious applicants was used during 5.5 months from October 1, 2012 to March
19, 2013. In this case, the two applicantswork experience ranged from 1 month at the beginning of
this part to 6.5 months at the end. During this period we sent a total of 375 applications. Table 5
and Figure 5 summarize the results of this second part:
Table 5 and Figure 5 show that both applicants had similar call-back rates (11.6% and 10.8%) at
the end of the second part of the experiment. These callback rates are lower than those in the rst
19 Information on the similarity of the applications during this period and additional robustness checks for this result
are available respectively in Annexes 3, 4 and 5.
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Figure 5: Call back rates for second two applicants
Application outcome Total
Type of applicant Negative Positive
Control candidate 168 (88.4%) 22 (11.6%) 190
Test candidate 165 (89.2%) 20 (10.8%) 185
Total 333 (88.8%) 42 (11.2%) 375
Table 5: Call-back statistics of the second two applicants
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part of the experiment, which was expected since the applicants have shorter work experience. The
two call-back rates are not signicantly di¤erent (Chi2 statistics=0.05; Pr=0.81), which leads us to
conclude that our two applicants are no longer di¤erent from the recruiterspoint of view.
The second part of the experiment from October, 2012 to March, 2013 is usefully divided into two
sub-periods: before and after December 2012, when the Facebook layout changed. Table 6 summarizes
the main results of the two sub-periods:
1st sub-period from Oct. 1 2012
to Nov. 30 2012
2nd sub-period from Dec. 1 2012
to March 19 2013
Total
Negative Positive Total Negative Positive Total
Control candidate 68 (84.0%) 13 (16.0%) 81 100 (91.7%) 9 (8.3%) 109 190
Arabic candidate 65 (92.9%) 5 (7.1%) 70 100 (87.0%) 15 (13.0%) 115 185
Total 133 (88.1%) 18 (11.9%) 151 200 (89.3%) 24 (10.7%) 224 375
Table 6: Call-back statistics of the last two applicants by sub-periods
During the rst two months of the second part with the new applicants (new names and graduation
dates), we again observe an 8-percentage point gap in call back rates between the control (16.0%)
and the test (7.1%) candidates. A Chi2 test indicates the signicance of this di¤erence at the 10%
threshold (Chi2 statistics=2.84; Pr=0.092). In other words, during the rst eight months of the
experiment the gap between the two types of applicants remained fairly constant, and highlighted the
use of online proles in employersselection processes.
In December 2012 we observe a decreased gap between our applicant pairs. During the last 4
months of the experiment, the test candidate has a call-back rate that is not statistically di¤erent from
that of the control applicant, respectively 13.0% and 8.3% (Chi2 statistics=1.34; Pr=0.24). After 8
months characterized by a constant gap in call-backs between the two applicants, the Facebook layout
changed and the gap shrank. After the change, our results suggest that both applicants are similar
from the point of view of employers. Since the strength of the Arabic signal on the test Facebook
prole was reduced by the layout change, distinguishing the two applicants would require deeper
browsing of proles. Our result is conrmed by other studies on discrimination showing that language
skill concerns are a strong element of job discrimination (Oreopoulos, 2009; Edo et al., 2013).20 This
20 In Edo et al. (2013), the mention of a language-related skill was randomly attributed to half of the applications
sent, and consisted of reference to an award in a language contest, writing in a college newspaper, or membership of a
crossword club. Discrimination dropped substantially for female (not male) applicants with this addition. Oreopoulos
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part of the experiment is thus consistent with search behavior which does not involves very thorough
screening by employers of applicantsSNS proles and reliance only on the front page. More study
is required to characterize this behavior further. For instance, the applicantseducation level in our
experiment is three years undergraduate study; it remains to be seen whether more senior jobs would
involve more thorough SNS prole screening.
5 Conclusion
This study aimed at extending the relatively scarce literature on recruiters search strategies. We
investigate the potential use of SNSs, in our case Facebook, as a reliable source of information about
applicants for recruiters during hiring. So far, the literature has focused only on the usual sources
of information on applicants (application material and referrals). Declarative surveys on the use of
SNSs in hiring are a¤ected by a strong declarative bias due to the ethical and legal issues surrounding
the collection of applicants personal data. We therefore set up a eld experiment, using real job
o¤ers for accountants in the greater Paris area. This experiment consisted in creating two ctitious
applicants that di¤ered only in their perceived origins, observable solely on their Facebook prole.
In line with the literature on discrimination, this signal  if observed and considered reliable  is
expected to have a signicant negative e¤ect on the call-back rates of the test applicant compared to
the control. Conversely, if recruiters do not screen applicantsFacebook prole, the quasi-similarity
of their application material (resume and cover letter) will lead to similar call-back rates for both.
During 12 months (from March 2012 to March 2013), we applied for job openings for accountants in
the Paris region using pseudo-random assignment method, and sent more than 400 applications per
applicant.
The experiment is split into two sub periods - before and after the Facebook layout change in
December 2012. The rst sub-period from March 2012 to December 2012 shows a clear and consistent
gap of 8 percentage points between the control (21.3%) and test (13.4%) applicants. The experimental
protocol ensures that the signicant di¤erence results from observation of the Arabic signal only
available on the test applicants Facebook prole. The main result of this article is that SNSs are
used in hiring to screen applicants and dramatically a¤ect French employers decision to grant an
(2009) complemented large-scale experimentation by an audit study and interviews to highlight this motivation for
discrimination.
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interview. This 40 % gap between the two applicants (with similar professional competences) shows
that Facebook really impact the hiring process, and then, the French labor market functioning. For
many recruiters, Facebook proles have become a part of the application material.
The second part of the experiment is based on an unexpected change in the layout of Facebook
proles which occurred in December, 2012. This modication strongly a¤ected the Arabic signal as
only a part of it (i.e. the hometown) still appeared on the Facebook front page, while the second part
(i.e. language spoken) was positioned at the bottom of a secondary page (in the "About" tab). This
natural experiment allowed us to learn more about the SNS screening practices of recruiters since,
following this change the two candidates exhibited no signicant di¤erence in their call-back rates.
It suggests that screening is not thorough, illustrating the existence of search costs for employers to
browse an entire prole.
An implication for policy is that applicants should know that their SNSs proles are considered
reliable means of assessment and selection by many French recruiters. In this study, a di¤erence in
the online proles led to a drop of 40 % in the number of callbacks. It is therefore important during a
job search to treat the SNS prole as a part of the application material. A communication campaign
could be organized to inform people of the secondary use of their online personal information and
the potential consequences for the probability of nding a job and for their professional careers. Our
ndings also suggest potential solutions, ranging from locking ones prole, to cleaning ones SNS
prole during job search or various assessment periods, to the use of multiple SNS proles ("o¢ cial"
accessible to anyone, and private), to the use of an avatar. However, the impact of not having an
online presence while looking for a job should be assessed in further studies.
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Annex 1. Job applications by sector and applicants type
Control
applicant
Test
applicant
Accounting 10.5% 10.1%
Association/Union 4.0% 3.6%
Transport 4.0% 4.8%
Bank/insurance 3.6% 3.8%
Construction 3.3% 4.1%
Retail trade 5.5% 5.5%
Wholesale trade 10.9% 10.8%
Audit & consulting 6.2% 6.5%
Culture/leisure 1.9% 2.2%
Sector Management 4.8% 4.1%
Teaching/research 3.6% 3.1%
Hotel/restaurant 3.3% 4.1%
Real estate 4.8% 4.8%
Telecom/computer 3.8% 4.3%
Health/social 5.7% 6.2%
Public organizations 1.9% 1.9%
Advertising/communication 3.6% 3.1%
Business services 9.1% 8.2%
Personal services 3.6% 3.8%
Industry/energy/waste 5.9% 5.0%
Seine-et-Marne 4.5% 4.3%
Yvelines 9.8% 9.6%
Essonne 6.2% 7.2%
Hauts-de-Seine 16.4% 17.0%
Seine-Saint-Denis 10.7% 10.3%
Val-de-Marne 9.8% 10.6%
Location Val-dOise 4.0% 3.8%
Paris central districts 6.7% 6.5%
Paris North-East districts 5.9% 5.8%
Paris North-West districts 14.1% 13.7%
Paris South-East districts 4.5% 3.8%
Applicantsdistrict and 7.4% 7.4%
contiguous Parisian districts
Total number of applications 420 417
Paris areas denitions:
 Paris central district: 1st , 2nd , 3rd , 4th and 5th Paris districts ;
 Paris North-East districts: 10th , 11th , 19th and 20th Paris districts ;
 Paris North-West districts: 8th , 9th , 17th and 18th Paris districts ;
 Paris South-East districts: 12th and 13th Paris districts ;
 Applicants district and contiguous Paris districts: 15th , 16th , 17th , 6th and 7th Paris districts.
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Annex 2. Robustness check: whole experiment
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Applicant type
Control app. ref. ref. ref.
Test app. -0.206+ (0.107) -0.254** (0.116) -0.240** (0.115)
Application delay
No delay - - - - ref. ref.
1 day - - - - 0.069 (0.212) 0.045 (0.207)
2 days - - - - -0.110 (0.224) -0.159 (0.219)
3 days - - - - -0.413 (0.260) -0.425+ (0.255)
4 days - - - - -0.418 (0.313) -0.443 (0.307)
5-9 days - - - - 0.081 (0.314) 0.047 (0.309)
Contract type
Short term contract - - - - ref. ref.
Long term contract - - - - -0.146 (0.138) -0.185 (0.138)
Job position
Accounting assistant - - - - ref. ref.
Acc. & secretary assist. - - - - 0.262 (0.176) 0.213 (0.175)
Other accounting assist. - - - - -0.606 (0.494) -0.626 (0.482)
Accountant - - - - 0.101 (0.167) -0.054 (0.159)
Specialized accountant - - - - 0.166 (0.214) -0.017 (0.208)
Mean wage o¤er - - - - -0.099*** (0.032) - - - -
Required education
Bac+3 - - - - ref. ref.
Not specied - - - - -0.578** (0.268) -0.453+ (0.264)
CAP/BEP - - - - -1.285** (0.598) -1.097+ (0.577)
Bac - - - - -0.824** (0.344) -0.649+ (0.331)
Bac+2 - - - - -0.437+ (0.263) -0.318 (0.257)
Required work experience
No work experience ref. ref.
6 months-1 year - - - - 0.045 (0.197) 0.035 (0.195)
2 years - - - - -0.008 (0.162) -0.073 (0.159)
3 years - - - - -0.070 (0.187) -0.190 (0.186)
4 or 5 years - - - - -0.417+ (0.220) -0.631*** (0.208)
to be continued on next page
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Public transport time
Less than 30 minutes - - - - ref. ref.
31-60 minutes - - - - -0.279** (0.133) -0.270** (0.132)
61-90 minutes - - - - -0.692*** (0.205) -0.670*** (0.205)
91-120 minutes - - - - -0.345 (0.362) -0.300 (0.362)
120+ minutes - - - - -0.808+ (0.477) -0.819 (0.499)
Firm size
5- employees - - - - ref. ref.
6-19 emp. - - - - -0.079 (0.168) -0.090 (0.168)
20-49 emp. - - - - 0.107 (0.175) 0.078 (0.174)
50-249 emp. - - - - 0.077 (0.189) 0.015 (0.186)
250+ emp. - - - - -0.048 (0.230) -0.046 (0.228)
Firm sector
Accounting - - - - ref. ref.
Association/Union - - - - -0.434 (0.378) -0.407 (0.379)
Transport - - - - 0.275 (0.293) 0.372 (0.287)
Bank/insurance - - - - -0.331 (0.348) -0.295 (0.339)
Construction - - - - -0.635 (0.563) -0.591 (0.563)
Retail trade - - - - -0.185 (0.302) -0.140 (0.300)
Wholesale trade - - - - -0.322 (0.268) -0.280 (0.264)
Audit & consulting - - - - -0.061 (0.283) -0.058 (0.278)
Culture/leisure - - - - -0.720 (0.487) -0.624 (0.509)
Management - - - - -0.197 (0.306) -0.145 (0.297)
Teaching/research - - - - -1.249*** (0.409) -1.105*** (0.411)
Hotel/restaurant - - - - -0.964** (0.384) -0.863** (0.376)
Real estate - - - - -0.178 (0.317) -0.150 (0.314)
Telecom/computer - - - - -0.376 (0.315) -0.404 (0.318)
Health/social - - - - -0.114 (0.331) -0.018 (0.333)
Public organization - - - - -0.391 (0.507) -0.221 (0.518)
Advertising/communication - - - - -0.120 (0.330) -0.125 (0.322)
Business services - - - - -0.376 (0.272) -0.343 (0.272)
Personal services - - - - -0.630 (0.394) -0.527 (0.391)
Industry, energy and waste - - - - -1.386*** (0.455 -1.287*** (0.435)
Firm status
Private ref. ref.
Public 0.431 (0.307) 0.408 (0.312)
Not-for-Prot 0.377 (0.239) 0.317 (0.243)
end of table, see next page
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Time dummies
March 2012 - - - - ref. ref.
April 2012 - - - - -1.213*** (0.419) -1.216*** (0.412)
May 2012 - - - - -0.299 (0.336) -0.323 (0.336)
June 2012 - - - - 0.052 (0.329) 0.027 (0.327)
July 2012 - - - - -0.339 (0.319) -0.365 (0.316)
Aug. 2012 - - - - -0.166 (0.336) -0.186 (0.336)
2012-09-01 - - - - -0.329 (0.329) -0.390 (0.327)
2012-10-01 - - - - -0.403 (0.353) -0.465 (0.346)
2012-11-01 - - - - -0.477 (0.360) -0.503 (0.358)
Dec. 2012 - - - - -0.358 (0.395) -0.356 (0.386)
2013-01-01 - - - - -0.356 (0.369) -0.369 (0.366)
Feb. 2013 - - - - -0.721+ (0.387) -0.762** (0.381)
March 2013 - - - - -0.907** (0.432) -0.963** (0.425)
Constant -0.960*** (0.073) 1.785*** (0.579) 0.673 (0.453)
Observations 837 837 837
Pseudo-R2 0.005 0.169 0.158
Robust standard errors in brackets.
+, ** and *** mean respectively signicant at 10%, 5% and 1% tresholds.
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Annex 3. 1st part of experiment: job and rm characteristics of applications
Variable Description
Control
candidate
Test
candidate
Job position Accountant: 44.3% 43.1%
Specialized acc.: 9.6% 10.3%
Accounting assistant: 23.9% 29.3%
Acc. & secretary assistant: 18.7% 14.7%
Other accounting assistant: 3.5% 2.6%
Contract Long term (CDI) 28.7%* 19.4%*
Short term (CDD) 71.3%* 80.6%*
Short term contract lenght (mean/sd/min/max, month): 8.2/4.1/6/24 7.8/3.3/6/24
Worktime21 (mean/sd/min/max): 34.3/5.4/7.5/39 34.2/5.6/16/43
Required education Not specied: 40.4% 38.8%
CAP/BEP: 1.3% 2.1%
Bac: 11.3%* 5.2%*
Bac +2: 42.6% 49.6%
Bac +3: 4.4% 4.3%
Required work experience No experience: 25.2% 27.1%
6 months-1 year: 12.6% 12.5%
2 years: 27.8% 23.3%
3 years: 16.5% 19.4%
4 or 5 years: 17.9% 17.7%
Mean wage (mean/sd/min/max, e/hour): 12.3/2.4/9.2/23.4 12.3/2.2/8.5/19.8
Application delay22 (mean/sd/min/max): 1.3/1.2/0/5* 1.6/1.3/0/6*
Size 0-5 employees: 23.5% 23.3%
6-19 emp.: 27.8% 29.7%
20-49 emp.: 17.8% 19.0%
50-249 emp.: 21.3% 21.1%
250+ emp.: 9.6% 6.9%
Firm status Private: 83.0% 83.6%
Public: 6.5% 4.7%
Not-for-prot: 10.4% 11.6%
Sector See Annex 4 - - - -
Location See Annex 4 - - - -
Total number of applications 230 232
* indicates a signicant di¤erence in mean or proportion between the two applicants at 5% thresh-
old.
Note: Given the large number of variables taken into account, some di¤erences between the two
applicants could appear among control variables for sub-period of the experimentation. For instance,
we can observe signicant proportion or mean di¤erences between the two applicants in the Table
below for contract type, application delay and some job positions. For some extent, these di¤erences
stem from the detailed manner we opted to expose the variables. In a less detailed way and without
loss of relevance, all accounting assistant positions could be merged (accounting assistant, accounting
and secretary assistant, and, other accounting assistant), and then the proportion di¤erence would not
hold any more. In the case of contract type, the di¤erence is not due to a detailed manner to present
this variable but to our pseudo-random assignment method during which we focus more especially on 4
characteristics: rms size and sector in addition to job position and required work experience. Then,
some di¤erences could temporally appear among other control variables. For application delay, some
21French standard weekly worktime = 35h
22Number of business days between the ad publication and the application sending
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di¤erence could appear due to the fact that at least two co-authors are involved in the preparation
and checking of the application materials. For each applicant type, the sending is carried only by
one co-author. Depending on authorsavailability, this last operation could imply some variations
in application sending. According to models in Annex 5, the type of contract duration and the
application delay have not however any signicant inuence on the outcome of the application.
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Annex 4. 1st part of experiment: job applications by sector, location and applicants
type
Control
applicant
Test
applicant
Accounting 10.4% 11.7%
Association/Union 3.1% 3.5%
Transport 5.7% 4.3%
Bank/insurance 2.6% 4.8%
Construction 2.6% 3.1%
Retail trade 5.2% 6.5%
Wholesale trade 10.0% 10.8%
Audit & consulting 5.6% 6.9%
Culture/leisure 1.8% 1.3%
Sector Management 4.4% 3.0%
Teaching/research 5.2% 3.4%
Hotel/restaurant 6.1% 4.3%
Real estate 3.0% 4.3%
Telecom/computer 4.4% 5.2%
Health/social 6.5% 5.6%
Public organizations 1.7% 2.2%
Advertising/communication 4.8% 4.3%
Business services 7.4% 7.4%
Personal services 3.0% 2.2%
Industry/energy/waste 6.5% 5.2%
Seine-et-Marne 4.4% 3.0%
Yvelines 9.1% 8.6%
Essonne 4.8% 9.1%
Hauts-de-Seine 16.1% 15.5%
Seine-Saint-Denis 10.0% 12.1%
Val-de-Marne 12.2% 8.2%
Location Val-dOise 4.4% 3.5%
Paris central districts 9.1% 8.2%
Paris North-East districts 6.5% 5.2%
Paris North-West districts 11.7% 13.8%
Paris South-East districts 5.2%* 1.3%*
Applicants district and 6.5% 8.6%
contiguous Parisian districts
Total number of application 230 232
* indicates a signicant di¤erence in proportion at the 5% threshold.
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Annex 5: 1st part of experiment robustness check
Applicant type
Control app. ref. ref. ref.
Test app. -0.431*** (0.159) -0.404*** (0.156) -0.313** (0.139)
Application delay
No delay ref. ref. - - - -
1 day 0.264 (0.240) 0.200 (0.240) - - - -
2 days -0.129 (0.275) -0.188 (0.274) - - - -
3 days -0.300 (0.331) -0.327 (0.321) - - - -
4 days 0.269 (0.383) 0.267 (0.371) - - - -
5-9 days 0.820+ (0.459) 0.796+ (0.467) - - - -
Contract type
Short term contract ref. ref. - - - -
Long term contract -0.034 (0.196) -0.112 (0.195) - - - -
Job position
Accounting assistant ref. ref. - - - -
Acc. & secretary assist. 0.254 (0.240) 0.198 (0.239) - - - -
Other accounting assist. -0.598 (0.562) -0.669 (0.557) - - - -
Accountant -0.140 (0.226) -0.322 (0.217) - - - -
Specialized accountant 0.141 (0.305) -0.119 (0.299) - - - -
Mean wage o¤er -0.131*** (0.044) - - - - - -
Required education
Bac+3 ref. ref. - - - -
Not specied -0.619 (0.386) -0.387 (0.367) - - - -
CAP/BEP -0.766 (0.722) -0.543 (0.695) - - - -
Bac -1.199** (0.477) -0.898** (0.454) - - - -
Bac+2 -0.318 (0.377) -0.119 (0.362) - - - -
Required work experience
No experience ref. ref.
6 months-1 year -0.038 (0.292) -0.013 - - - -
2 years 0.178 (0.227) 0.076 - - - -
3 years -0.002 (0.256) -0.154 - - - -
4 or 5 years -0.440 (0.296) -0.736*** - - - -
Public transport time
Less than 30 minutes ref. ref. - - - -
31-60 minutes -0.359** (0.177) -0.353** (0.173) - - - -
61-90 minutes -0.764*** (0.277) -0.759*** (0.273) - - - -
91-120 minutes -0.734 (0.591) -0.729 (0.587) - - - -
120+ minutes -0.160 (0.586) -0.327 (0.670) - - - -
end of table, see next page
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Firm size
5- employees ref. ref. - - - -
6-19 emp. 0.176 (0.230) 0.162 (0.229) - - - -
20-49 emp. 0.378 (0.250) 0.322 (0.246) - - - -
50-249 emp. 0.338 (0.268) 0.247 (0.260) - - - -
250+ emp. 0.412 (0.309) 0.398 (0.307) - - - -
Firm sector
Accounting ref. ref. - - - -
Association/Union -0.287 (0.490) -0.275 (0.495) - - - -
Transport 0.641+ (0.376) 0.701+ (0.374) - - - -
Bank/insurance -0.304 (0.441) -0.263 (0.433) - - - -
Construction -0.029 (0.770) 0.016 (0.760) - - - -
Retail trade -0.002 (0.384) 0.050 (0.383) - - - -
Wholesale trade -0.250 (0.373) -0.218 (0.371) - - - -
Audit & consulting 0.397 (0.381) 0.367 (0.376) - - - -
Culture/leisure -0.957+ (0.541) -0.941+ (0.536) - - - -
Management -0.681 (0.489) -0.515 (0.454) - - - -
Teaching/research -1.658*** (0.464) -1.506*** (0.474) - - - -
Hotel/restaurant -0.882+ (0.452) -0.793+ (0.434) - - - -
Real estate 0.046 (0.445) 0.098 (0.433) - - - -
Telecom/computer -0.137 (0.403) -0.225 (0.407) - - - -
Health/social 0.118 (0.446) 0.161 (0.455) - - - -
Public orga. -0.098 (0.660) 0.015 (0.657) - - - -
Advertising/communication -0.194 (0.423) -0.207 (0.409) - - - -
Business services -0.398 (0.417) -0.379 (0.421) - - - -
Personal services -1.153+ (0.678) -1.009 (0.644) - - - -
Industry, energy and waste -1.143** (0.531) -1.040** (0.501) - - - -
Firm status
Private ref. ref.
Public 0.423 (0.439) 0.382 (0.436)
Not-for-Prot 0.305 (0.313) 0.211 (0.316)
Time dummies
March 2012 ref. ref. - - - -
April 2012 -1.343*** (0.439) -1.340*** (0.430) - - - -
May 2012 -0.329 (0.379) -0.364 (0.382) - - - -
June 2012 0.048 (0.361) -0.019 (0.364) - - - -
July 2012 -0.529 (0.340) -0.576+ (0.344) - - - -
Aug. 2012 -0.205 (0.371) -0.229 (0.373) - - - -
Sept. 9 2012 -0.310 (0.374) -0.401 (0.375) - - - -
Constant 1.826** (0.784) 0.386 (0.592) -0.796*** (0.093)
Observations 462 462 462
Pseudo-R2 0.232 0.216 0.012
Robust standard errors in brackets. +, ** and *** mean respectively signicant at 10%, 5% and
1% tresholds.
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Annex 6. 2nd part of experiment: job and rm characteristics of applications
Variable Description
Control
candidate
Test
candidate
Job position Accountant: 37.4% 34.1%
Specialized accountant: 18.4% 22.7%
Accounting assistant: 29.0%* 20.0%*
Acc. & secretary assistant: 12.6%* 20.5%*
Other accounting assistant: 2.6% 2.7%
Contract Long term (CDI) 21.1%* 32.4%*
Short term (CDD) 78.9%* 67.6%*
Short term contract duration (mean/sd/min/max, month): 7.2/2.5/6/18 8.3/4.7/6/36
Worktime23 (mean/sd/min/max, hours): 33.6/6.4/8/40 33.9/5.9/8/39
Required education Not specied: 34.2% 41.6%
CAP/BEP: 3.2% 2.2%
Bac: 8.9% 9.7%
Bac +2: 47.9% 41.1%
Bac +3: 5.8% 5.4%
Required work experience No experience: 21.1% 18.4%
6 months-1 year: 10.5% 13.0%
2 years: 29.5% 28.1%
3 years: 18.4% 18.9%
4 or 5 years: 20.5% 21.6%
Mean wage (mean/sd/min/max, e/hour): 12.8/2.7/8.6/23.6 12.5/2.4/8.6/20.8
Application delay24 (mean/sd/min/max): 2.7/1.5/0/7 2.5/1.7/0/9
Size 0-5 employees: 23.7% 23.8%
6-19 emp.: 27.4% 24.3%
20-49 emp.: 22.1% 21.1%
50-249 emp.: 16.8% 18.9%
250+ emp. 10.0% 11.9%
Firm status Private: 82.7% 82.1%
Public: 5.9% 5.0%
Not-for-prot: 11.4% 12.9%
Sector See Annex 7 - - - -
Location See Annex 7 - - - -
Total number of applications 190 185
* indicates a signicant di¤erence in mean or proportion between the two applicants at 5% thresh-
old.
Note: in the Table below, we can notice again some di¤erences in proportion for some job positions
and contract type. For job positions, these di¤erences do not hold anymore if we consider all accounting
assistant positions together. Concerning contract type, this is the opposite case as in the rst part
of the experiment (see Annex 3). According to models in Annex 9, both job characteristics have not
any signicant inuence on the outcome of the application.
23French standard weekly worktime = 35h
24# of business days between the ad publication and the application sending
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Annex 7. 2nd part of experiment: job applications by sector and applicants type
Control
applicant
Test
applicant
Accounting 10.5% 8.1%
Association/Union 5.2% 3.8%
Transport 2.1% 5.4%
Bank/insurance 4.8% 2.7%
Construction 4.2% 5.4%
Retail trade 5.8% 4.3%
Wholesale trade 12.1% 10.8%
Audit & consulting 6.8% 6.0%
Culture/leisure 2.1% 3.2%
Sector Management 5.3% 5.4%
Teaching/research 1.6% 2.2%
Hotel/restaurant 0.0%* 3.8%*
Real estate 6.8% 5.4%
Telecom/computer 3.2% 3.2%
Health/social 4.7% 7.0%
Public organizations 2.1% 1.6%
Advertising/communication 2.1% 1.6%
Business services 11.1% 9.2%
Personal services 4.2% 6.0%
Industry/energy/waste 5.3% 4.9%
Seine-et-Marne 4.8% 6.0%
Yvelines 10.5% 10.8%
Essonne 7.9% 4.9%
Hauts-de-Seine 16.8% 15.1%
Seine-Saint-Denis 11.6% 8.1%
Val-de-Marne 6.8%* 13.5%*
Location Val-dOise 3.7% 4.3%
Paris central districts 3.7% 4.3%
Paris North-East districts 5.3% 6.5%
Paris North-West districts 16.8% 13.5%
Paris South-East districts 3.7% 7.0%
Applicantsdistrict and 8.4% 6.0%
contiguous Parisian districts
Total number of application 190 185
* indicates a signicant di¤erence in mean or proportion between the two applicants at 5% thresh-
old.
Note: Proportion equality tests are not satised for one sector (hotel/restaurant) and one area
(Val-de-Marne). However, these two rm characteristics have no signicant inuence on the outcome
of application according to Annex 8.
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Annex 8. 2nd part of experiment: robustness check
Applicant type
Control app. ref. ref. ref.
Test app. -0.228 (0.190) -0.207 (0.185) -0.040 (0.171)
Application delay
No delay ref. ref. - - - -
1 day -0.650 (0.477) -0.529 (0.469) - - - -
2 days -0.626 (0.488) -0.596 (0.479) - - - -
3 days -1.142** (0.510) -1.020** (0.500) - - - -
4 days -1.945*** (0.624) -1.851*** (0.592) - - - -
5-9 days -0.989+ (0.594) -0.917 (0.567) - - - -
Contract type
Short term contract ref. ref. - - - -
Long term contract -0.173 (0.223) -0.223 (0.221) - - - -
Job position
Accounting assistant ref. ref. - - - -
Accounting, secretary and other assist. 0.250 (0.291) 0.160 (0.287) - - - -
Accountant 0.680** (0.287) 0.439+ (0.260) - - - -
Specialized accountant 0.526 (0.338) 0.268 (0.317) - - - -
Mean wage o¤er -0.114*** (0.044) - - - - - - - -
Required education
Bac+3 ref. ref. - - - -
Not specied or BEP/CAP -0.386 (0.373) -0.335 (0.382) - - - -
Bac -0.176 (0.456) -0.051 (0.459) - - - -
Bac+2 -0.441 (0.369) -0.352 (0.372) - - - -
Required work experience
No experience ref. ref.
6 months-1 year 0.139 (0.300) 0.071 (0.295) - - - -
2 years -0.214 (0.248) -0.286 (0.246) - - - -
3 years -0.118 (0.301) -0.255 (0.300) - - - -
4 or 5 years -0.459 (0.354) -0.714** (0.336) - - - -
Public transport time
Less than 30 minutes ref. ref. - - - -
31-60 minutes -0.266 (0.227) -0.241 (0.227) - - - -
61-90 minutes -0.928*** (0.356) -0.837** (0.354) - - - -
90+ minutes -0.578 (0.429) -0.461 (0.425) - - - -
end of the table, see next page
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Firm size
5- employees ref. ref. - - - -
6-19 emp. -0.585** (0.269) -0.562** (0.263) - - - -
20-49 emp. -0.296 (0.262) -0.303 (0.261) - - - -
50-249 emp. -0.011 (0.281) -0.060 (0.280) - - - -
250+ emp. -0.815** (0.385) -0.756** (0.379) - - - -
Firm sector
Accounting ref. ref. - - - -
Association/Union -0.845 (0.563) -0.761 (0.566) - - - -
Bank/insurance -0.742 (0.537) -0.671 (0.518) - - - -
Construction and real estates -1.010** (0.469) -0.907** (0.463) - - - -
Retail trade, hotel and restaurant -0.487 (0.525) -0.417 (0.527) - - - -
Wholesale trade -0.773+ (0.424) -0.675 (0.417) - - - -
Audit & consulting -0.865+ (0.476) -0.814+ (0.470) - - - -
Culture/leisure -0.822 (0.734) -0.590 (0.767) - - - -
Management 0.172 (0.444) 0.172 (0.444) - - - -
Teaching/research -1.194 (0.920) -0.955 (0.901) - - - -
Telecom/computer -0.940+ (0.529) -0.930+ (0.532) - - - -
Health/social -0.594 (0.548) -0.332 (0.513) - - - -
Public orga. -0.980 (0.963) -0.645 (0.981) - - - -
Advertising/communication 0.126 (0.561) 0.041 (0.565) - - - -
Business services -0.499 (0.398) -0.437 (0.400) - - - -
Personal services -0.918+ (0.483) -0.729 (0.477) - - - -
Industry, energy, waste and transport -1.579*** (0.611) -1.302** (0.571) - - - -
Firm status
Private ref. ref.
Public 0.679 (0.511) 0.664 (0.502)
Not-for-Prot 0.521 (0.366) 0.461 (0.363)
Time dummies
Oct. 2012 ref. ref. - - - -
Nov. 11 2012 0.086 (0.298) 0.094 (0.293) - - - -
Dec. 2012 0.109 (0.332) 0.180 (0.320) - - - -
Jan. 1 2013 0.014 (0.339) 0.119 (0.336) - - - -
Feb. 2013 -0.201 (0.310) -0.182 (0.311) - - - -
March 2013 -0.561+ (0.340) -0.538+ (0.325) - - - -
Constant 2.440*** (0.891) 1.008 (0.717) -1.196*** (0.119)
Observations 375 375 375
Pseudo-R2 0.195 0.177 0.0002
Robust standard errors in brackets. +, ** and *** mean respectively signicant at 10%, 5% and
1% tresholds.
Note: some sectors have to be merged due to perfect predictability of results otherwise. This is
the case here for: construction and real estate, retail trade and hotel/restaurant, and industry, energy,
waste and transport.
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Annex 9. 2nd part of experiment: job and rm characteristics of the applications for
the 2 sub-periods
1st sub-period (from Oct. 1 2012 2nd sub-period (from Dec.1 2012
to Nov. 30 2012) to Mar. 19 2013)
Variable Description
Control
candidate
Test
candidate
Control
candidate
Test
candidate
Job position Accountant: 30.9% 31.4% 42.2% 35.7%
Specialized acc.: 18.5% 17.1% 18.4% 26.1%
Accounting assistant: 32.1% 25.7% 26.6% 16.5%
Acc. & secretary ass.: 14.8% 21.4% 11.0% 20.0%
Other acc. assistant: 3.7% 4.3% 1.8% 1.7%
Contract Long term (CDI) 14.8%* 35.7%* 25.7% 30.4%
Short term (CDD) 85.2%* 64.3%* 74.3% 69.6%
Short term contract duration 7.0/1.5/6/10 7.8/2.4/6/12 7.2/2.8/6/18 8.5/5.8/6/36
(mean/sd/min/max, month):
Worktime25 (mean/sd/min/max): 33.0/6.6/8/39 33.8/5.9/8/39 34.0/6.2/9.5/40 33.9/6.0/9.5/39
Required education Not specied: 34.6% 42.9% 33.9% 40.9%
CAP/BEP: 2.5% 4.3% 3.7% 0.9%
Bac: 9.9% 8.6% 8.3% 10.4%
Bac +2: 48.2% 44.3% 47.7% 39.1%
Bac +3 4.9%* 0.0%* 6.4% 8.7%
Required work exp. No experience: 19.8% 21.4% 22.0% 16.5%
6 months-1 year: 11.1% 11.4% 10.1% 13.7%
2 years: 33.3% 35.7% 26.6% 23.5%
3 years: 22.2% 17.1% 15.6% 20.0%
4 or 5 years: 13.6% 14.3% 25.7% 26.1%
Mean wage (mean/sd/min/max, e/hour): 12.8/2.5/9.4/23.1 12.5/2.7/8.6/20.8 12.9/2.9/8.6/23.6 12.4/2.1/9.2/23.6
Application delay26 (mean/sd/min/max, days): 2.3/1.1/0/6* 1.6/0.9/0/4* 2.9/1.7/0/7 3.0/1.9/0/9
Size 0-5 employees: 17.3% 22.9% 28.4% 24.4%
6-19 emp.: 28.4% 22.9% 26.6% 25.2%
20-49 emp.: 29.6%* 14.3%* 16.5% 25.2%
50-249 emp.: 17.3% 25.7% 16.5% 14.8%
250+ emp.: 7.4% 14.3% 11.9% 10.4%
Firm status Private: 82.7% 81.4% 81.7% 79.1%
Public: 3.7% 5.7% 6.4% 5.2%
Not-for-prot: 13.6% 12.9% 11.9% 15.7%
Sector See Annex 10 - - - - - - - -
Location See Annex 10 - - - - - - - -
Total number of applications 81 70 109 115
* indicates a signicant di¤erence in mean or proportion between the two applicants at 5% thresh-
old.
Note: signicant di¤erence in proportion or mean for the rst sub-period, namely for contract
type, application delay, one education level and one rm size can be observed. Given the shortness of
this unexpected sub-period, this type of di¤erence might be inevitable. However, it applied to only a
few variables that have no signicant inuence on the outcome of applications according to Annex 10
and 11.
25French standard weekly worktime = 35h
26# of business days between ad publication and application sending
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Annex 10. 2nd part of experiment: job applications by sector and applicants type
for the 2 sub-periods
1st sub-period (from Oct. 1 2012 2nd sub-period (from Dec. 1 2012
to Nov. 30 2012) to Mar. 19 2013)
Control
applicant
Test
applicant
Control
applicant
Test
applicant
Accounting 7.4% 7.1% 12.8% 8.7%
Association/Union 5.0% 2.9% 5.5% 4.4%
Transport 1.2% 4.3% 2.8% 6.1%
Bank/insurance 4.9% 4.3% 4.6% 1.7%
Construction 6.2% 7.1% 2.8% 4.4%
Retail trade 4.9% 4.3% 6.4% 4.4%
Wholesale trade 11.1% 14.3% 12.8% 8.7%
Audit & consulting 7.4% 1.4% 6.4% 8.7%
Culture/leisure 3.7% 1.4% 0.9% 4.4%
Sector Management 1.2% 7.1% 8.3% 4.4%
Teaching/research 0.0% 1.4% 2.8% 2.6%
Hotel/restaurant 0.0% 2.9% 0.0%* 4.4%*
Real estate 11.1% 7.1% 3.7% 4.4%
Telecom/computer 2.3% 4.3% 3.7% 2.6%
Health/social 7.4% 5.7% 2.8% 7.8%
Public organizations 1.2% 2.9% 2.8% 0.9%
Advertising/communication 3.7% 1.4% 0.9% 1.8%
Business services 13.6% 8.6% 9.2% 9.6%
Personal services 4.9% 7.1% 3.7% 5.2%
Industry/energy/waste 2.5% 4.3% 7.3% 5.2%
Seine-et-Marne 3.7% 7.1% 5.5% 5.2%
Yvelines 11.1% 11.4% 10.1% 10.4%
Essonne 9.9%* 0.0%* 6.4% 7.8%
Hauts-de-Seine 22.2% 14.3% 12.8% 15.7%
Seine-Saint-Denis 9.9% 8.6% 12.8% 7.8%
Val-de-Marne 3.7% 11.4% 9.2% 14.8%
Location Val-dOise 2.5% 8.6% 4.6% 1.7%
Paris central districts 0.0% 4.3% 6.4% 4.4%
Paris North-East districts 7.4% 5.7% 3.7% 7.0%
Paris North-West districts 21.0% 14.3% 13.8% 13.0%
Paris South-East districts 0.0%* 8.6%* 6.4% 6.1%
Applicantsdistrict and 8.6% 5.7% 8.3% 6.1%
contiguous Parisian districts
Total number of application 81 70 109 115
* indicates a signicant di¤erence in mean or proportion between the two applicants at 5% thresh-
old.
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Annex 11. 2nd part of experiment: robustness checks for the 1st sub-period
Applicant type
Control app. ref. ref. ref.
Test app. -1.207*** (0.428) -0.929** (0.382) -0.473+ (0.168)
Application delay
No delay ref. ref. - - - -
1 day 1.495 (1.066) 1.312+ (0.797) - - - -
2 days 0.652 (1.042) 0.404 (0.735) - - - -
3 days -0.011 (1.052) 0.220 (0.784) - - - -
4-9 days 0.445 (1.232) -0.092 (0.932) - - - -
Contract type
Short term contract ref. ref. - - - -
Long term contract -0.213 (0.482) -0.327 (0.464) - - - -
Job position
Accounting assistant ref. ref. - - - -
Account., secretary and other assist. -0.718 (0.640) -1.024+ (0.563) - - - -
Accountant 1.095** (0.533) 0.565 (0.427) - - - -
Specialized accountant 0.481 (0.633) -0.236 (0.502) - - - -
Mean wage o¤er -0.330*** (0.111) - - - - - - - -
Required education
Bac+3 ref. ref. - - - -
Not specied or BEP/CAP -0.007 (0.900) -0.333 (0.883) - - - -
Bac -0.101 (1.148) 0.016 (1.086) - - - -
Bac+2 -0.443 (0.890) -0.599 (0.864) - - - -
Required work experience
No experience ref. ref.
6 months-1 year 0.368 (0.659) -0.042 (0.632) - - - -
2 years 0.352 (0.476) 0.079 (0.417) - - - -
3 years 0.136 (0.612) -0.443 (0.558) - - - -
4 or 5 years 0.763 (0.681) -0.241 (0.527) - - - -
Public transport time
Less than 30 minutes ref. ref. - - - -
31-60 minutes -0.318 (0.490) -0.067 (0.432) - - - -
61-90 minutes -1.343 (0.853) -0.413 (0.648) - - - -
90+ minutes -0.152 (0.689) 0.411 (0.643) - - - -
end of the table, see next page
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Firm size
5- employees ref. ref. - - - -
6-19 emp. -1.191+ (0.650) -0.931+ (0.554) - - - -
20-49 emp. -1.010+ (0.581) -0.750 (0.501) - - - -
50-249 emp. -0.805 (0.620) -0.488 (0.503) - - - -
250+ emp. -2.309*** (0.771) -2.223*** (0.853) - - - -
Firm sector
Accounting ref. ref. - - - -
Association/Union 5.846*** (1.172) 5.244*** (0.967) - - - -
Construction and real estates 5.270*** (0.885) 4.349*** (0.599) - - - -
Retail trade, hotel and restaurant 7.021*** (1.157) 5.781*** (0.892) - - - -
Wholesale trade 5.718*** (1.126) 4.752*** (0.726) - - - -
Audit & consulting 6.304*** (0.932) 5.672*** (0.723) - - - -
Culture/leisure -0.430 (1.193) -1.178 (1.110) - - - -
Management 5.364*** (1.104) 4.435*** (0.906) - - - -
Telecom/computer 7.068*** (1.150) 5.354*** (0.909) - - - -
Health/social 5.958*** (0.947) 6.026*** (0.870) - - - -
Public orga., teaching/research 6.947*** (1.176) 7.150*** (1.075) - - - -
culture/leisure
Advertising/communication 6.469*** (1.303) 5.645*** (1.123) - - - -
Business services 5.418*** (0.967) 4.614*** (0.767) - - - -
Personal services, bank and insurance 5.842*** (1.012) 5.293*** (0.844) - - - -
Industry, energy, waste and transport 6.574*** (1.065) 5.658*** (0.817) - - - -
Firm status
Private ref. ref.
Public 0.208 (0.643) -0.015 (0.583)
Not-for-Prot -0.212 (0.684) -0.603 (0.592)
Time dummies
Oct. 2012 ref. ref. - - - -
Nov. 1 2012 0.026 (0.402) -0.018 (0.356) - - - -
Constant -2.434 (1.686) -5.043*** (1.378) -0.992*** (0.168)
Observations 151 151 151
Pseudo-R2 0.355 0.303 0.027
Robust standard errors in brackets. +, ** and *** mean respectively signicant at 10%, 5% and
1% tresholds.
Note: some sectors have to be merged due to perfect predictability of results otherwise. This is
the case here for: construction and real estate; retail trade and hotel/restaurant; public organization,
research/teaching and culture/leisure; personal services and bank/insurance, and, industry, energy,
waste and transport.
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Annex 12. Robustness check: 2nd part of experiment for the 2nd sub-period
Applicant type
Control app. ref. ref. ref.
Test app. 0.613+ (0.316) 0.614** (0.312) 0.264 (0.228)
Application delay
No delay ref. ref. - - - -
1 day -1.805*** (0.678) -1.746*** (0.677) - - - -
2 days -1.197+ (0.662) -1.197+ (0.654) - - - -
3 days -2.067*** (0.786) -2.016*** (0.774) - - - -
4-9 days -2.629*** (0.796) -2.617*** (0.780) - - - -
Contract type
Short term contract ref. ref. - - - -
Long term contract -0.815** (0.367) -0.865** (0.353) - - - -
Job position
Accounting assistant ref. ref. - - - -
Account., secretary and other assist. 0.565 (0.500) 0.501 (0.478) - - - -
Accountant 0.989** (0.463) 0.838** (0.427) - - - -
Specialized accountant 0.646 (0.612) 0.439 (0.562) - - - -
Mean wage o¤er -0.060 (0.079) - - - - - - - -
Required education
Bac+3 ref. ref. - - - -
Not specied or BEP/CAP -1.031+ (0.539) -0.932+ (0.560) - - - -
Bac -0.531 (0.648) -0.469 (0.644) - - - -
Bac+2 -0.915+ (0.553) -0.847 (0.547) - - - -
Required work experience
No experience ref. ref.
6 months-1 year 0.361 (0.416) 0.297 (0.402) - - - -
2 years -0.425 (0.434) -0.449 (0.419) - - - -
3 years -0.533 (0.480) -0.597 (0.463) - - - -
4 or 5 years -1.445** (0.597) -1.587*** (0.545) - - - -
Public transport time
Less than 30 minutes ref. ref. - - - -
31-60 minutes -0.013 (0.365) -0.020 (0.364) - - - -
61-90 minutes -0.845 (0.521) -0.910+ (0.526) - - - -
90+ minutes -0.908 (0.766) -0.866 (0.722) - - - -
end of the table, see next page
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Firm size
5- employees ref. ref. - - - -
6-19 emp. -0.479 (0.427) -0.505 (0.422) - - - -
20-49 emp. -1.990*** (0.654) -2.012*** (0.614) - - - -
50-249 emp. -0.595 (0.551) -0.636 (0.528) - - - -
250+ emp. -0.923 (0.959) -0.948 (0.947) - - - -
Firm sector
Accounting ref. ref. - - - -
Construction and real estates -1.283+ (0.696) -1.165+ (0.667) - - - -
Retail and wholesale trade, hotel -1.728*** (0.571) -1.573*** (0.567) - - - -
and restaurant
Audit, consulting and management -1.428** (0.583) -1.380** (0.590) - - - -
Health/social 0.204 (0.714) 0.274 (0.707) - - - -
Public organization, teaching/research, -3.074*** (1.112) -2.890*** (1.081) - - - -
culture/leisure
Advertising/communication -1.003 (1.028) -1.019 (0.941) - - - -
Business services, computer/telecom, -1.308** (0.521) -1.194** (0.510) - - - -
industry, energy, waste and transport
Personal services, bank and insurance -1.257 (0.818) -1.131 (0.806) - - - -
Firm status
Private ref. ref.
Public 1.982** (0.902) 1.881** (0.891)
Not-for-Prot 0.058 (0.505) 0.103 (0.499)
Time dummies
Dec. 2012 ref. ref. - - - -
Jan. 1 2013 0.257 (0.394) 0.238 (0.394) - - - -
Feb. 2013 -0.101 (0.415) -0.100 (0.403) - - - -
Mar. 2013 -0.600 (0.406) -0.661 (0.414) - - - -
Constant 3.558** (1.473) 2.894** (1.245) -1.388*** (0.174)
Observations 224 224 224
Pseudo-R2 0.389 0.387 0.009
Robust standard errors in brackets. +, ** and *** mean respectively signicant at 10%, 5% and
1% tresholds.
Note: some sectors have to be merged due to perfect predictability of results otherwise. This is
the case here for: construction and real estate; retail trade, wholesale trade and hotel/restaurant; au-
dit/consulting and management; public organization, research/teaching and culture/leisure; personal
services and bank/insurance, and, industry/energy/waste, computer/telecom. and transport.
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Annex 13. Experiment timing
Figure 6: Timing of the experiment
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Annex 14. Resume with pre-dened sentences to be matched to a job opening (orig-
inal version)
47
Annex 14b. Resume with pre-dened sentences to be matched to a job opening
(translated version)
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Annex 15. Example of a resume sent in an application (original version)
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Annex 15b. Example of a resume sent in an application (translated version)
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Annex 16. Cover letter with pre-dened sentences to be matched to a job opening
(original version)
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Annex 16b. Cover letter with pre-dened sentences to be matched to a job opening
(translated version)
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Annex 17. Example of a cover letter sent in an application (original version)
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Annex 17b. Example of a cover letter sent in an application (translated version)
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Annex 18. Facebook prole before the layout change
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Annex 19. Facebook prole after the layout change: Timeline tab
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Annex 20. Facebook prole after the layout change: About tab
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Annex 18b Translation of Annex 18: Content of Facebook Prole
Accueil: homepage
Retrouver des amis: nd friends
Thomas Marvaux: rst name and name of the applicant
Voici comment votre journal peut être vu par: Public: This is what your timeline looks like to:
Public
A¢ cher en tant quune personne particulière: Display for particular people
A étudié à IAE Gustave Ei¤el - Paris Est: studied at the Gustave Ei¤el Business school East
Paris.
Habite à Paris: lives in Paris.
De Brive-la-Gaillarde: From Brive-la-Gaillarde (a French city)
Né le 20 Avril: birth date April, the 20th
A propos: about
Vous connaissez Thomas? Si vous connaissez Thomas, invitez-le ou envoyez-lui un message: did
you know Thomas? If you know him, invite him or send him a message.
Emploi and formation: Job position and education
Lycée Louis Armand - Paris: Louis Armand High School - Paris
IAE Gustave Ei¤el Paris Est: Gustave Ei¤el Business school East Paris
2010-2011 Créteil*: year of promotion (2010) and Créteil is the French city where the Gustave
Ei¤el Business school is located
IUT Sceaux: Sceaux Institute of Technology
Promotion 2010 Gestion des Entreprises et des Administrations, Sceaux, Ile-de-France, France:
year of promotion (2010) and title of the diploma: Business and administration management, Sceaux,
Parisregion.
Info: information
A propos: about
Habite à: location
Né le 20 Avril: birth date April, the 20th
Parle Anglais et Italien: speak English and Italian
Homme: male
+1 Ajouter: Add friend
Message: message
Photos: pictures
Carte: map
Album: portfolio
Photos de prol: prole pictures
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Annex 19b. Translation of Annex 19: Content of Facebook Prole
Accueil: homepage
Retrouver des amis: nd friends
Voici comment votre journal peut être vu par: Public: This is what your timeline looks like to:
Public
A¢ cher en tant quune personne particulière: Display for a particular people
Nicolas Lautrant: rstname and name of the applicant
Journal: journal
A propos: about
Photos: pictures
Amis: friends
Plus: more
Vous connaissez Nicolas?: Did you know Nicolas (Lautrant)?
Pour voir ce quil partage avec ses amis. Envoyez lui une invitation: To see what he shares with
friends. Send him an invitation.
A propos: about
A étudié à Licence 3 CCA à IAE Gustave Ei¤el: studied at the Gustave Ei¤el Business school
for three-year higher education degree in accounting.
Auparavant: IUT De Sceaux et Lycée Louis Armand: Before at the Sceaux Institute of Tech-
nology and the Louis Armand high school.
Habite à Paris: lives in Paris
De Marrakech: From Marrakech (Morocco)
Français (France) . Condentialité . Conditions dutilisation . Cookies . Plus: French (France)
. Privacy policy . Terms of use . Cookies . More.
Diplôme de IAE Gustave Ei¤el, 2012, Université, Licence 3 CCA: Diploma from Gustave Ei¤el
Business school, year 2012, University, three-year higher education degree in accounting.
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Annex 20b. Translation of Annex 20: Content of Facebook Prole
Accueil: homepage
Retrouver des amis: nd friends
Voici comment votre journal peut être vu par: Public: This is what your timeline looks like to:
Public
A¢ cher en tant quune personne particulière: Display for a particular people
Nicolas Lautrant: rstname and name of the applicant
Journal: journal
A propos: about
Photos: pictures
Amis: friends
Plus: more
+1 Ajouter: add friends
Message: message
A propos: about
Pour voir ce quil partage avec ses amis. Envoyez lui une invitation: To see what he shares with
friends. Send him an invitation.
Emplois et scolarité: job and scholarship.
IAE Gustave Ei¤el, Promotion 2012, Licence 3 CCA: studied at the Gustave Ei¤el Business
school in 2012, three-year higher education degree in accounting.
IUT De Sceaux, Promotion 2011, DUT GEA, Sceaux, Ile-de-France, France: Sceaux Institute of
Technology in 2011, two-year higher education degree in Business and Administration Management,
Sceaux, Parisregion, France.
Lycée Louis Armand, Paris: Louis Armand High School, Paris.
Lieux de residence: home adress
Paris, ville actuelle: Paris, current location
Marrakech, ville dorigine: Marrakesh, origin city
Informations generals: general information
Sexe: homme: gender: male
Langues: Arabe marocain et Français: languages: Moroccan arabic and French
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